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Abstract
This article explores so-called ‘loss and damage’ as well as the emerging legal infra-
structure that seeks to address it. The article concludes by identifying some of the deep 
points of contention in the international discourse on loss and damage, particularly 
regarding compensation, and considerations for a successful resolution of the impasse 
that loss and damage has produced.
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After the mitigation and adaptation infrastructure has done its best work, 
irreparable loss will still occur. Accelerating climate change, and related events 
such as ocean acidification, will produce new and unprecedented shifts in 
temperature extremes, precipitation, sea-level rise, and the severity and dura-
tion of natural disasters. Disasters generally are events that produce wide-
spread damage and cause severe alterations in ‘the normal functioning 
of communities and societies.’1 Climate change amplifies existing disasters 
and renders previously quite manageable weather events into devastating 
occurrences. Further, researchers have documented or modeled the dispropor-
tionate impact that climate change generally—and its worst impacts 
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fccc/sbi/2012/inf.14 (2012), at 3–4, <unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/sbi/eng/inf14.pdf> 
(hereinafter unfccc sbi Literature Review) (‘Loss and damage includes the effects of the 
full range of climate change related impacts, from increasing (in number and intensity) 
extreme weather events to slow onset events and combinations of the two’).
4 Ibid., at 5.
5 Laura Schäfer and Sönke Kreft, ‘Loss and Damage: Roadmap to Relevance for the Warsaw 
International Mechanism’, Germanwatch (March 2014), at 5, <http://germanwatch.org/en/
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specifically—will continue to mete out on the developing world, which 
suffers from less resilient economies and greater dependence on natural 
capital.2 This article explores so-called ‘loss and damage’—‘the actual and/or 
potential manifestation of impacts associated with climate change in develop-
ing countries that negatively affect human and natural systems’3—as well as 
the emerging legal infrastructure that seeks to address it. The article concludes 
by identifying some of the deep points of contention in the international 
discourse on loss and damage, particularly regarding compensation, and 
considerations for a successful resolution of the impasse that loss and damage 
has produced.
1 Defining Terms
While the presence of damage and irreparable loss is evident in current and 
projected climate change impacts,4 there is no consensus on how to define the 
destruction that these impacts produce. There are, however, recurrent themes. 
Loss refers to climate-related impacts for which restoration is not possible. 
The total destruction of coastal infrastructure due to sea-level rise, or the total 
collapse of a fishery due to lower ocean pH, would constitute a loss. The inabil-
ity of communities to restore or repair that which is impacted characterizes 
climate-related loss. The loss can be economic (loss of geological freshwater 
resulting from glacier melt) or non-economic (loss of heritage when territories 
become inhabitable).5 The latter is perhaps most compelling and confounding 
from both the socio-economic and legal perspectives. Climate-induced 
displacement, loss of productive or sovereign territory due to slow-onset 
processes such as desertification and sea-level rise, and disruptions to society 
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9 See ibid.
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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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14 Ibid.
from permanent emergency situations,6 are among the most difficult to 
resolve. Further, these losses often undermine one’s ability to withstand future 
stressors, increasing one’s vulnerability.7
Damage refers to negative impacts for which restoration is possible. Damage 
to a coastal mangrove forest due to a storm surge would fall under this cate-
gory.8 Presumably, appropriate adaptation efforts or disaster-risk management 
could mitigate or avoid impacts suffered as a result. Together, loss and damage 
describe ‘the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated 
with climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and 
natural systems’.9 Both interact with human systems,10 exacerbating their pre-
existing socio-economic vulnerability. Both can halt or reverse development 
and ‘reinforce cycles of poverty’,11 with particularly dire consequences for the 
least developed.12
As a management matter, the failure of sufficient mitigation and the ineffi-
cacy of adaptation efforts—assuming communities have had the capacity and 
political will to apply them—requires a legal and decision-making infrastruc-
ture that can address the resulting ‘residual risks’, when possible, to secure 
against loss and damage.13 There is evidence that the ‘countries with the high-
est levels of residual risk are those that will be the least able to manage loss and 
damage in the future. They are also the countries that may be in need of the 
greatest support to manage loss and damage.’14 For example, whereas small 
122 Burkett
climate law 4 (2014) 119-130
15 See, e.g., Warner, supra note 7, at 73 (explaining that the four case studies presented ‘pro-
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damage … Their livelihood, food security, housing, social capital and cultural values are 
affected because limits to coping and adaptive capacity are already being surpassed.’).
16 Ibid., at 26 (‘Future loss and damage is potentially of inconceivable magnitude— 
especially considering non-economic values and the interconnectivity leading to cascad-
ing, transnational effects’).
17 See generally Warner, supra note 7.
18 Ibid., at 74.
19 Ibid., at 75 (defining adaptation limits as ‘when the magnitude, frequency and scale of 
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islands are experiencing early, and devastating climate impacts today,15 the 
prospect of future, increasing loss and damage are especially concerning,16 
particularly as the world pushes beyond the worst assumptions regarding 
emissions and exposure variables. Nevertheless, these impacts fall through 
the gaps in the climate governance regimes, particularly those governing 
adaptation.
2 The Limits of Adaptation
Adaptation has both constraints and limits to its efficacy and relevance. 
‘Adaptation constraints’ are factors or circumstances that impede the planning 
and implementation of effective adaptation measures.17 Some of the climate-
related loss and damage occurs and will continue to occur because there is 
inadequate support for adaptation. At the individual or household level, these 
constraints might include lack of information, skills, or resources. At the 
national or international level, inappropriate governance structures may 
impede action,18 and in conjunction with a lack of financial resources present 
insurmountable hurdles.
The limits of adaptation, however, inhere in the function and purpose of 
adaptation. Adaptation assumes that the impact is one to which individuals 
and communities can adapt—that one can accommodate the disturbance.19 
Some disturbances, like desertification, will be too great for even the best-laid 
adaptation infrastructure. So, while there is no consensus regarding the defini-
tions of loss and damage, there is a shared sense that impacts will occur beyond 
those that adaptation can address.
The confluence of limits and constraints predominate. In small-island 
developing states (sids), for example, the civil-engineering plans typical of 
adaptation projects funded by the undercapitalized Adaptation and Green 
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in Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for Legal Remedies, edited by 
Randall S. Abate and Elizabeth Ann Kronk (Edward Elgar 2013), at 347 (citing the ipcc’s 
acknowledgement of cultural impacts having deeper effects than first appears through 
the damaging of culturally informed flexibility and resilience).
22 See generally Warner, supra note 7.
23 Ibid., at 69. Negative side effects include the very cultural and heritage impacts that loss 
and damage seeks to effect. ‘For example, large rocks from ancient ruins have been used 
to build seawalls, resulting in severe damage to the cultural heritage of the island.’ Ibid. 
These high limits of adaptation were also apparent in Ethiopia (96 per cent) and ‘for the 
other three case studies, the proportion of households experiencing residual loss and 
damage was lower (69–78 per cent), but still a majority.’ Ibid., at 73.
24 See Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss: an 
assessment of the loss and damage mechanism under the unfccc process’, in Threatened 
Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, edited by 
Michael B. Gerrard and Gregory E. Wannier (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), at 438 (explaining that owing to the lack of risk transfer and sharing, develop-
ing countries are reliant on financial assistance from donor countries to respond to 
extreme events); see, e.g., Paul Brown, ‘Simultaneous Disasters Batter Pacific Islands’, 
Climate Funds will not suffice.20 At some point, the sea walls of the Maldives 
and Tuvalu will fail so consistently and completely that communities and 
countries will need compensation for rehabilitation from losses incurred. 
Further, for sids, the cascading effect of disrupted customary institutions and 
subsistence lifestyles, which have aided resilience to climate variability in the 
past, could mean the loss of whole cultures.21
Case studies looking specifically at the adequacy of adaptation measures, 
which communities have effectively executed, have found early signals of 
these limits.22 A study of the island of Kosrae in the Federated States of 
Micronesia found that while adaptation measures in response to coastal ero-
sion, such as building sea walls and planting trees at the shoreline, reduced 
some adverse impacts, these measures were insufficient. Indeed, ninety-two 
per cent of those who implemented these measures reported that not only 
were they insufficient, in some cases they resulted in negative side effects.23 
This does not augur well for other island states and vulnerable countries, as 
Kosrae has higher levels of human economic development than other sites 
studied.
For the present and forecast climate impacts, the response regime is deeply 
flawed and will soon become wholly inadequate. Presently, sids rely on ad 
hoc requests for disaster aid when a devastating event occurs.24 These ad hoc 
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-batter-pacific-islands-16171>.
25 ipcc, 2012: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 1, at 10.
26 See Alliance of Small Island States (aosis), ‘Informal Dialogue on Loss and Damage’, 
Montego Bay, Jamaica (10–12 March 2013), at 6 (on file with author) (citing existing 
unfccc institutions which were seen as having responsibilities that were relevant to loss 
and damage, including the Conference of Parties, the Adaptation Committee, and the 
National Adaptation Planning Process).
27 The main adaptation institutions under the Framework Convention also include: the 
Least Developed Country Expert Group, the National Adaptation Plans, and the Nairobi 
Work Programme.
28 See ‘Green Climate Fund’ <www.gcfund.net> (The ‘Fund will promote the paradigm shift 
towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support 
to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to 
the impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs of those developing coun-
tries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’). As discussed 
briefly in the next section, a compensation mechanism as part of a loss-and-damage 
regime, for example, could respond to phenomenon to which communities cannot adapt. 
In that sense, a loss-and-damage mechanism would operate in tandem with these 
adaptation-oriented entities.
29 Subsidiary Body on Implementation, Submission of Nauru on behalf of the Alliance of 
Small Island States, Views and information on elements to be included in the recommenda-
tions on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/cp.16 (28 September 2012), at 1 
(hereinafter unsbi Nauru Submission). This hole has existed in spite of consistent 
attempts to fill it. For a full chronology of attempts to advance aosis’ loss-and-damage 
measures are often slow to arrive. They increase the likelihood of funders and 
communities introducing maladaptive measures in the wake of disaster 
recovery. As explained by the ipcc, ‘An emphasis on rapidly rebuilding houses, 
reconstructing infrastructure, and rehabilitating livelihoods often leads to 
recovering in ways that recreate or even increase existing vulnerabilities, and 
that preclude longer-term planning and policy changes for enhancing resil-
ience and sustainable development.’25 Loss and damage also falls beyond the 
purview of other, related unfccc institutions.26 The current institutions, such 
as the Adaptation Committee or the Green Climate Fund,27 neither have a 
broad-enough mandate nor sufficient resources to manage an expanded man-
date. Further, the Green Climate Fund is not an appropriate venue for compen-
sation for losses, which is a possible component of a loss-and-damage regime.28
For all of these reasons, the Alliance of Small Island States (aosis) has 
concluded that the absence of a comprehensive loss-and-damage mechanism 
for the most vulnerable is a ‘gaping hole’ in the Framework Convention 
process.29
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proposal at the unfccc, see aosis, Expert Meeting on Loss and Damage (17 May 2013) 
(on file with author); aosis, Informal Dialogue on Loss and Damage, supra note 26; 
aosis, Loss and Damage Briefing (2012) (on file with author); aosis, Proposal to the awg-
lca, ‘Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change 
Impacts’ (2008); Decision 3/cp.18, fccc/cp/2012/8/Add.1.
30 This latter point is quite controversial. See discussion infra.
31 For a way to understand the progression of impacts and residual risks and the appropriate 
response, see Richard S. J. Tol and Roda Verheyen, ‘State responsibility and compensation 
for climate change damages—a legal and economic assessment,’ 32 Energy Policy (2004), 
at 1109–1130.
32 unsbi Nauru Submission, supra note 29, at 18–19. The most prominent example is the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. See The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility, <www.ccrif.org> (last visited July 23, 2013).
33 Ibid., at 23.
34 Ibid.
3 Approaches to Loss and Damage
It is becoming clear that beyond the efforts to mitigate and adapt, efforts to 
insure against disaster risks and compensate for unavoidable impacts30 may 
also be necessary.31 Support for regional or global risk-transfer mechanisms 
and catastrophe funds have grown more vocal. Risk transfer would allow a 
country or entity to pay a fee to an insurer or another pool of countries that 
would then pay for an amount of climate-related loss and damage.32 Diverse 
stakeholders deem these kinds of insurance mechanism to be essential com-
ponents of an international loss-and-damage mechanism. They would help 
rapidly disburse funds after the climate stressor to affected areas—areas that 
usually suffer greater impacts due to the absence or delay of financial resources 
for rebuilding or rehabilitating livelihoods.
Risk transfer, however, is not sufficient to address all climate-related loss 
and damage. Losses from long-term foreseeable risks or residual risks, such as 
sea-level rise and desertification, will require ‘the accumulation of resources’, 
according to the United Nations.33 Those resources ‘may be dealt with using a 
combination of institutional and governance approaches, management and 
financial tools’.34 More specifically, many in the developing world have 
called for a compensation or rehabilitation mechanism that collects and 
distributes funds to address residual risks. Further, there is a strong sense that 
the developed world, in particular, has a legal and moral obligation to help 
rehabilitate and compensate communities for climate-related losses that 
are unavoidable despite adaptation, or not avoided because of inadequate 
mitigation. Notwithstanding the controversy regarding obligations, calls for 
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35 See Kim Chipman and Alex Morales, ‘Islands Seek Funds for Climate Damage at un 
Discussions’, Bloomberg.com, 4 December 2012, <www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/
islands-seek-funds-for-climate-damage-at-un-talks.html> (citing eu Climate Com-
missioner Connie Hedegaard’s statement that the twenty-seven member bloc has been 
supportive of the concept, though there are some reservations on how to proceed). 
Hedegaard explained, ‘We think that it’s not really mature enough yet to say this is exactly 
how we do it. We need some more work on that, but we have signaled very clearly to them 
that we are open to find a solution on loss and damage.’ Ibid. See also Malia Talakai, 
‘Climate Conversations – Small island states need action on climate loss and damage’, 
Thomson Reuters Foundation, 30 August 2012, <www.trust.org/item/?map=small-island 
-states-need-action-on-climate-loss-and-damage/>. Given staunch opposition to the 
proposal in the past, the fact that loss and damage took a central role in the Doha climate 
negotiations took many by surprise. M. Crocker, ‘Loss and Damage Reflects New Era of 
the Climate Talks’, Alliance of Small Island States, 15 April 2013, <http://aosis.org/
loss-and-damage-reflects-new-era-of-the-climate-talks/>.
36 See Alliance of Small Island States, Proposal to the awg-lca, ‘Multi-Window Mechanism 
to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts’ (2008) (hereinafter aosis 
Multi-Window Mechanism).
these insurance and compensation components persist, and the adaptation 
infrastructure cannot develop and implement them.
In sum, insurance and compensation, as part of the loss-and-damage 
discourse, seek to respond to the absence of an established infrastructure to 
manage the impacts and coordinate an optimal response.
Efforts to elaborate on an appropriate mechanism have gained traction. The 
next section details significant advances in development of a loss-and-damage 
mechanism.
4 Historical Development of Loss and Damage under the unfccc
Since 1991, loss and damage has been a priority for the Alliance of Small Island 
States, the forty-four state coalition of small-island and low-lying coastal coun-
tries that share environmental and development concerns, particularly about 
their vulnerability to climate change. A 1991 proposal by aosis, referenced in 
the Framework Convention process and widely supported by developing coun-
tries with growing developed-country support,35 conceived of an international 
mechanism building on early calls for an insurance mechanism for vulnerable 
island states, through which they can access funds immediately after a disaster. 
That initial insurance proposal evolved by 2008 into a multi-pronged mecha-
nism that also includes provisions for disaster-risk management and—for 
climate impacts that are unavoidable and irreversible—compensation and 
rehabilitation.36
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37 Decision1/cp.13.
38 Decision1/cp.13 1(c)(iii). See also 1(c)(i), 1(c)(ii), 1(c)(iii) and 1(c)(v) on adaptation, as well 
as paragraphs 1(e)(i), 1(e)(ii), 1(e)(iii), 1(e)(iv), 1(e)(v), and 1(e)(vi) on finance and invest-
ment (cited in aosis Multi-Window Mechanism, supra note 36).
39 Decision 1/cp.16; see also unfccc sbi Literature Review, supra note 3, at 23.
40 Decision 1/cp.16, at para. 25.
41 Ibid., at para. 26.
42 Decision 3/cp.18, fccc/cp/2012/8/Add.1
43 Ibid.
Though the well-being of small islands has been a stated concern since the 
unfccc’s inception, opposition to mechanisms that might suggest developed-
world liability and developing-world access to compensation stalled meaning-
ful negotiation on loss and damage. Indeed, attention to loss and damage at 
the unfccc did not begin in earnest until 2007 with the Bali Action Plan.37 
The Plan called for enhanced adaptation efforts, including strategies and 
means to address loss and damage in developing countries, particularly for 
those most vulnerable.38 The call reflected the sense behind Article 4.8 of the 
unfccc, which referred to insurance as a tool to meet the specific needs and 
concerns of developing countries.
In 2010, the Cancun Adaptation Framework noted that approaches to 
address loss and damage should consider impacts, including sea-level rise, 
increasing temperatures, and ocean acidification.39 It further recognized 
the ‘need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise in order to 
understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and 
slow-onset events.’40 Decision 1/cp.16 launched, among other things, the 
Work Programme on Loss and Damage to ‘consider including through work-
shops and expert meetings, as appropriate, approaches to address loss and 
damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’41 cop 
17 in Durban elaborated on the work programme’s goals and its role in the 
Framework Convention.
Decision 3/cp.18 emerged from the cop 18 meetings in Doha and represented 
a significant advance in the loss-and-damage discussion. It recognized the 
importance of the work on loss and damage, including the need to build 
‘comprehensive climate risk management approaches’.42 It also called 
for advanced understanding of non-economic loss and damage, patterns 
of migration and displacement, and identification and development of 
approaches to rehabilitation following climate-related loss and damage.43 
Further, the so-called Doha Gateway mandated the formation of ‘institutional 
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44 Ibid. Although this mandate suffered setbacks in subsequent international meetings in 
Bonn, a loss-and-damage mechanism remains a key deliverable. See Laurie Goering, 
‘Africa: Vulnerable States Decry Slow Progress at Bonn Climate Talks’, allAfrica, 17 June 
2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201306181411.html>.
45 M. Crocker, supra note 35.
46 Decision 2/cp.19.
arrangements, such as an international mechanism, including its functions 
and modalities’ for the next cop.44 Given the staunch opposition that the 
loss-and-damage proposal received in years prior, that it assumed a central 
role in the Doha climate negotiations took many by surprise.45 Although the 
proposal suffered setbacks, it remained firmly on the Framework Convention’s 
agenda.
Actions during cop 19 in Warsaw institutionalized loss and damage within 
the international climate-governance regime. cop 19 established the Warsaw 
International Mechanism (wim) for Loss and Damage under the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework.46
This occurred amidst rancorous meetings during the two-week conference. 
Indeed, the discussion was so polarizing that the developing country G-77 bloc 
walked out of discussions during the second week of meetings. Bilateral dis-
cussions later in the week resuscitated the talks, achieving a compromise that 
resulted in the new mechanism. Importantly, while the decision legitimized 
the exploration of responses beyond mitigation and adaptation, the mecha-
nism does not promise compensation for climate-related loss and damage—a 
key feature for developing countries but a ‘red line’ for developed countries, 
particularly the United States.
The wim consists of a more measured, if rather conservative, approach to 
developing a loss-and-damage infrastructure. Specifically, to address loss and 
damage from both weather extremes and slow-onset events, the wim, under 
the direction of the Executive Committee of the wim, will undertake the 
following functions:
(a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk 
management approaches to address loss and damage associated with 
the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts … 
(b) Strengthening dialogues, coordination, coherence, and synergies 
among relevant stake-holders [and] (c) Enhancing action and support, 
including finance, technology and capacity building to address loss and 
damage.
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47 Chipman and Morales, supra note 35 (quoting Saleemul Huq, a Bangladeshi scientist 
based at London’s International Institute for Environment and Development).
48 Ibid. Though Davey uses ‘adaptation’ here, in the context of the exchange, loss and dam-
age is more appropriate.
49 Juan P. Hoffmaister et al., ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage: Moving 
from polarizing discussions towards addressing the emerging challenges faced by devel-
oping countries’, Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, 6 January 2014, 
<www.lossanddamage.net/4950>.
5 The Climate Compensation Conundrum and Other  
Nagging Concerns
The robust, if contentious, loss-and-damage debate, and the institutional prog-
ress it has made, reflect the acknowledgment and acceptance of two critical 
themes: the constraints and limits of adaptation and the indispensable push 
for more aggressive mitigation, which will stave off or avoid some of the worst 
extreme and slow-onset climate-related events. The debate has not, however, 
resolved the more troublesome issue of compensation.
While the parties generally fall into two camps, crudely defined by develop-
ing world ‘demands’ versus developed world ‘obstinacy’, the positions are more 
nuanced. As Saleemul Huq explains, ‘Developed countries hear that phrase, 
“loss and damage,” and they think of an international fund for compensation 
and liability—taboo subjects for them. There’s strong push back. The us has 
said there is no way they are going to do it.’47 The us approach contrasts, how-
ever, with other more balanced developed-country responses. uk Energy 
Secretary Ed Davey has stated, ‘We should be cautious about saying we are 
strictly liable for some particular event or some particular change. That does 
not mean we should not work with others to help some of the very poorest 
adapt to the impacts of climate change.’48 Similarly, on the part of developing 
countries, participants in the cop 19 negotiations decried the reduction of the 
loss-and-damage discussion to a ‘determin[ation] of liability’ and a pursuit 
of ‘financial compensation’.49 This complaint was in response to the both 
developed-world parties that would not engage on the issue and developing-
world voices that decried the wim, which they viewed as incomplete, absent a 
compensation component.
While liability and compensation are critical components of loss and 
damage, overemphasis on compensation often trivializes the complexity of 
the loss-and-damage discussion and diminishes the advances made in other 
elements of the negotiations, according to developing world negotiators. 
Framing loss and damage exclusively around compensation also distracts from 
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51 Ibid.
52 See Maxine Burkett, ‘Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism 
for Small Island States’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2014).
the very real and novel legal and governance challenges of, for example, loss of 
statehood and the associated challenges with migration and displacement, 
among other concerns.50 Money, in short, may not address the ‘actual underly-
ing needs’ of vulnerable communities and developing countries.51
That said, it is difficult to conceive of an adequate resolution of the ‘loss’ 
element of loss and damage without financial mechanisms for compensation. 
Of course, sound management regimes are essential—especially if distribu-
tion of compensation is involved. There are, however, models for effectively 
disbursing these funds52 to facilitate effective responses to residual, and 
disproportionately distributed, risks. The mechanics of this scheme are not 
insurmountable—at least in theory.
Confounding questions remain. Given the political and economic climate, 
how would the international community fund compensation? How would the 
wim fairly and sensibly delimit the recipients of compensation? How would it 
respond to circumstances in which a country or community has contributed to 
its heightened vulnerability through poor decision-making, for example? 
These questions are not limited to the compensation question. Indeed, they 
animate current discussions around adaptation funding as well as the emerg-
ing, yet underdeveloped, risk-transfer infrastructure. These are the issues that 
inhere in the climate circumstances in which the global community finds 
itself—hence, the turbulent nature of the international negotiations. Through 
these negotiations, and the development of loss and damage, it is apparent 
that the devil resides not only in the details, but in the climate crisis itself.
